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4. Impacts of cyber-physical attacks on the 
OWF 
For our investigation we have developed a full functional model of the WT and the 
corresponding structures consisting of the relevant cyber-physical systems (Fig. 3 
and  Fig. 4), a detailed model of the WT part in Fig. 1.  Parameters, control and 
protection signals in the WT control system can be manipulated maliciously so that 
limit thresholds can be exceeded by far even under normal environmental and 
power grid conditions. Corresponding chains of effect (propagation of the 
disturbance initiated by the manipulation) can arise affecting the mechanical 
(scenario 1 in Fig. 3) or the electrical (scenario 2 in Fig. 4) WT system. Excessive 
mechanical stresses, electrical and thermal loads can be realized, leading to extreme 
damage or even destruction of components/subsystems without the possibility of 
reactive intervention or timely recovery, corresponding to the In extremis state in 
Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 1 Functional model of a generic OWF. Solid arrows are flows of energy/matter, dashed lines flows 
of signals/data. DAQ: data acquisition; contr/mon: control and monitoring; prot/maint: protection and 
maintenance; Ek, WIND: kinetic energy of the wind; PWTs: electrical energy from the wind turbines; POWF: 
electrical energy from the wind farm; env: influence of the environmental conditions; WT: wind 
turbine; SCADA: supervisory control and data acquisition system; CMS: condition monitoring system; 
CC: control center 
Fig. 3 Chains of effect by scenario 1. Inlay photo: 
Comparable natural accident of structural failure 
and tower collapse of a large onshore WT due the 
same cause of rotor over-speed [6]. 
Fig. 4 Chains of effect by scenario 2. Inlay photo: 
Comparable natural accident of a burning onshore 
WT due to the same cause of overheat and fire [6].  
2. Functional system model and resilience 
degrees of a generic OWF 
A functional model describes the technical behavior of engineered, cyber-physical 
systems in relation to the intended task or results of the system. It is a 
representation of the operation, functionality and performance of the system, e.g. 
in the form of a block diagram, Fig. 1. The block diagram consists of components 
performing, according to their technical characteristics, and specified functions on 
the inputs. Applied to the OWF the components can be grouped into 
interconnected layers representing the main functional processes: energy 
conversion (1), data acquisition - control (2)/protection(3), control (4) and 
protection/maintenance  (5).    
 
 
Fig. 2 Conceptual resilience curve relating resilience degree, system states 
and resilience-enhancing measures of a generic OWF. 
3. Vulnerability to cyber-physical attacks 
By the cyber-physical attack a malicious software is infiltrated within the 
communication systems of the infrastructure through a physical security 
weakness. Most of the main functional processes shown in Fig. 1 can be 
manipulated in this way maliciously  [5]. So this vulnerability results also from the 
IT infrastructure, design of (i) the control system networks and (ii) the controllers 
within the OWF system.  
 
 
 
 
 
5. Measures against cyber-physical attacks 
Measures to prevent the cyber-physical attacks described in the previous chapter 
must take all aspects of the development and impact of the attacks into account. 
Therefore, both proactive and reactive measures as in Fig. 2 have to be 
considered, on component level as well as on functional level. Proactive measures 
include software changes in the layout of the controller Object Dictionaries and in 
the OPC protocols (must be read-only) regarding the control/protection signals. 
The physical and the cyber security within the OWF must be generally increased 
proactively, too, e.g. through motion sensors/CCTV and through 
authentication/encryption of the OPC protocols. Reactive measures would be the 
real-time monitoring and analysis of the network traffic between and within the 
layers of the functional models in Fig. 1 and Fig. 3-4. Apart from this monitoring 
of the deviations between the real OWF behavior and the simulated model in 
Fig.1 would indicate abnormal activities. 
6. Conclusions 
We have developed a functional system model of the OWF/WT. Through the 
model we have investigated the impacts of specific cyber-physical attacks on the 
OWF. The impacts can affect the OWF/WT functionality and performance 
extremely and its behavior is clearly non-resilient thereby. The power grid can be 
severely affected, too. So major security gaps definitely exist concerning the OWF 
vulnerability to cyber-physical attacks. We have proposed therefore proactive and 
reactive measures for closing the above gaps which we can evaluate as plausible 
in qualitative terms based on the proposed functional model. 
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The degree of resilience of a power generating system can be related to its 
system states and the implemented resilience-enhancing measures for prevention, 
emergency and restoration, Fig. 2 [3, 4]. Proactive measures are intended to avoid 
disruptive events, to reduce their frequency, or to limit demolitions, whereas the 
measures for damage containment, recovery and restoration are reactive by 
nature. 
 
1. Introduction 
The share of wind power generation is steadily increasing and it reached 20.4% of 
Germany’s power supply in 2018. Thus, wind power is becoming a critical 
infrastructure with major contributions to power supply and power system grid 
stability [1]. Consequently, a resilient operation of offshore wind farms (OWFs) is 
required under normal and disturbed conditions. Resilience stands for the ability of 
a complex system to proactively and reactively maintain its functionality and 
performance despite failures or manipulations  [2].  
Scope of this paper is the investigation of disturbances due to possible cyber-
physical attacks on an OWF and the resulting response to them in relation to OWF 
resilience. 
 
 
